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Guest Editorial, part of a Special Feature on The Governance of Adaptation
The governance of adaptation: choices, reasons, and effects. Introduction to
the Special Feature
Dave Huitema 1,2, William Neil Adger 3, Frans Berkhout 4, Eric Massey 5, Daniel Mazmanian 6, Stefania Munaretto 7, Ryan Plummer 8,9 
and Catrien C. J. A. M. Termeer 10
ABSTRACT. The governance of climate adaptation involves the collective efforts of multiple societal actors to address problems, or
to reap the benefits, associated with impacts of climate change. Governing involves the creation of institutions, rules and organizations,
and the selection of normative principles to guide problem solution and institution building. We argue that actors involved in governing
climate change adaptation, as climate change governance regimes evolve, inevitably must engage in making choices, for instance on
problem definitions, jurisdictional levels, on modes of governance and policy instruments, and on the timing of interventions. Yet little
is known about how and why these choices are made in practice, and how such choices affect the outcomes of our efforts to govern
adaptation. In this introduction we review the current state of evidence and the specific contribution of the articles published in this
Special Feature, which are aimed at bringing greater clarity in these matters, and thereby informing both governance theory and practice.
Collectively, the contributing papers suggest that the way issues are defined has important consequences for the support for governance
interventions, and their effectiveness. The articles suggest that currently the emphasis in adaptation governance is on the local and
regional levels, while underscoring the benefits of interventions and governance at higher jurisdictional levels in terms of visioning and
scaling-up effective approaches. The articles suggest that there is a central role of government agencies in leading governance
interventions to address spillover effects, to provide public goods, and to promote the long-term perspectives for planning. They highlight
the issue of justice in the governance of adaptation showing how governance measures have wide distributional consequences, including
the potential to amplify existing inequalities, access to resources, or generating new injustices through distribution of risks. For several
of these findings, future research directions are suggested.
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INTRODUCTION
This introductory article to the Special Feature “The Governance
of Adaptation” examines how climate change adaptation is being
tackled and organized in society, and how it could and should be
governed through individual and collective responses at various
scales. Human-induced climate change presents significant
challenges to scientific research. It also presents challenges to the
media, NGOs, civil society, and, not insignificantly, to politicians
and policy makers charged with the task of creating innovative
ways to avoid serious risks for many groups, sectors, and regions.
Climate change can be seen as a classic problem in public policy
given the levels of uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity.
Climate change is not the same problem everywhere; affected
social-ecological systems behave in nonlinear ways; costs and
benefits of climate change impacts are unevenly distributed;
measures to address climate risks can have unexpected and
undesired effects; and what is problematic for some might
represent an opportunity for others. Hence climate change risks
and public and private responses to them are unstructured in the
sense that relevant norms, processes, and facts are contested. The
research literature on climate change separates mitigation and
adaptation with mitigation focusing on reducing perturbations to
the carbon cycle as the main cause of human-induced climate
change, and adaptation focusing on adjustments to the
consequences of climate change in its impacts on natural and
social systems. Nevertheless, there has been a realization for more
than two decades that adaptation to the impacts of climate change
is both necessary and inevitable, and that acting on climate change
impacts does not diminish the case for continued and urgent
mitigation (Pielke et al. 2007).  
Adaptation requires positive adjustment and action, and
coordination between actors, even if  adaptation is also reactive
to changing climate variability. Although much adaptation is
likely to be very local and by private parties, coordination among
households, organizations, and regions will also be need to achieve
key collective objectives, such as flood protection, through
adaptation. This means that adaptation requires governance. The
term governance “... covers the whole range of institutions and
relationships involved in the process of governing” (Pierre and
Peters 2000:1). We adopt Kooiman’s (1993:4) idea that “...
governing refers to the totality of interactions, in which public as
well as private actors participate, aimed at solving societal
problems or creating societal opportunities; attending to the
institutions as contexts for these governing actions; and
establishing a normative foundation for all those activities.”
Governing is seen as directed behavior, involving government and
nongovernment parties, aimed at (re)solving a problem, or at
reaping the opportunities that a problem presents. Governance
requires the creation of institutions, a term that refers to the
foundation of new rules, organizations, and policies that give
stability to these directed behaviors. The term governance
describes “... the patterns that emerge from the governing
activities of social, political and administrative actors” (Kooiman
1993:2). It concerns “... the ways and means in which the divergent
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preferences of citizens are translated into effective policy choices,
about how the plurality of societal interests are transformed into
unitary action and the compliance of social actors is achieved”
(Kohler-Koch 1999:14).  
Adaptation governance refers to the patterns that emerge from
the governing activities of social, political, and administrative
actors in the realm of climate change adaptation. The governing
activities refer to their combined efforts to adapt to climate
change, their efforts to found institutions that deal with the issues,
and finally they refer to their ideas about appropriate normative
underpinnings for the way climate change adaptation should be
governed, taking into account wider social and political beliefs
and systems. The governance of societal adaptation to climate
change has been the subject of research over the past decade, but
this continues to be fragmented and has generally failed to inform
public policy and private responses.
EMERGING THEMES IN THE DEBATE
Although adaptation governance is not as firmly entrenched a
field of governing when compared to the discussions on
mitigation (compare Massey and Huitema 2013), a number of
interesting points stand out from our reading of the literature.
Below we elucidate these.  
First, adaptation is generally associated with different
jurisdictional levels than mitigation. Put most simply, mitigation
addresses a global problem and is seen as requiring an
international and national approach, whereas adaptation is
usually described as something that needs to occur at the local or
regional level, perhaps with some facilitation or assistance from
higher levels (Neufeldt et al. 2010). This is not only to do with
specific local climates and variability, but also with varying local
vulnerabilities and adaptive capacities.  
Second, whereas the leading concepts in mitigation are specific
and often quantifiable, e.g., the reduction of CO2 emissions, in
adaptation they are either generic (for instance, “to enhance
adaptive capacity,” “to increase resilience”) or very domain-
specific (for instance, “to maintain a flood protection standard”
or “to protect the productivity of a farming system”). Related to
this, one could argue that climate change adaptation governance
lacks a commonly agreed core goal or mission. Instead, it is about
the protection of many diverse social goals, including the health
of vulnerable groups, the resilience of critical infrastructures, the
preservation of farming livelihoods, and so on. Thus, it is
essentially about “everything,” which may lead to the risk of
creating confusion and misunderstandings. To paraphrase
Wildavsky (1973), if  climate adaptation governance is everything,
then maybe it is nothing?  
Third, it is increasingly understood that adaptation as practiced
involves both societal responses to extreme events, as well as
forward-looking planning for change and transformation (see
Adger et al. 2009). Terms such as adaptability, transformation,
adaptive management, resilience, and adaptive governance refer
to this forward looking process. Forward projections of climate
risks in different places and affecting different groups, and
assessments of adaptation options and strategies are knowledge-
intensive and often uncertain and contested. This means that
conflicts over the scientific underpinning of strategies and policies
are also relevant for the governance of adaptation (see van Aalst
et al. 2008).  
Fourth, there is be a qualitative difference between the thinking
about mitigation and adaptation in the sense that mitigation
action is constituted mainly by government measures and
concentrates on the distinction between regulation on the one
hand, and market-based and information approaches (such as
labelling, emissions trading, carbon taxation) on the other. The
debate on adaptation by contrast has been marked by an emphasis
on self-organization and adaptation by social actors, e.g.,
households, companies, civil society organizations. Adaptation
through conventional governance modes of regulation and
incentives (e.g., Mees 2014) to overcome deficits and spillovers of
autonomous adaptation and self-governance by social sectors are
much less common. Self-governance requires innovative
capacities and private resources, and these are not spread evenly
across society. So apart from the fact that impacts might differ,
per region, per city, per neighborhood, and even per household,
the capacity to understand and sense new climate-related risks
and to respond to them also varies. Coordinated adaptation is
also more likely to incorporate issues of fairness in process and
to promote the interests and voice of vulnerable populations and
more just outcomes.  
Fifth, there is an increasing interest in ecosystems-based
adaptation, an approach that moves away from a focus on
infrastructure toward protecting natural processes and reinstating
ecosystems to provide buffering and protection, including water
and coastal processes (see, e.g., Vignola et al. 2009, Meijerink and
Huitema 2010). Examples include efforts to imitate or recreate
new natural reefs in coastal defense works to break the power of
high energy tidal waves to replace dykes and dams, and the
installation of green roofs as a substitute for air conditioning.
Such a shift requires coordination and collective decision making
to widen the scope of framing problems and potential solutions.
GOVERNANCE CHOICES
Having described ongoing discussions in the debate on adaptation
governance, we now turn to the question of the design of
governance systems or as we deem them here, governance choices.
By positing these as choices, we are seeking to bring some further
clarity to the discussion, rather than implying that such choices
are always explicitly made by governors and other actors in the
process of addressing climate change adaptation problems.
Frequently, such choices will be the emergent outcomes of
complex political and institutional processes. We argue that such
choices can vary in a number of respects. Below we detail these
(following Jordan et al. 2010) and how they could relate to climate
change adaptation (following Massey et al. 2015).
Problem choices
Governing is a purposive activity, but precisely which problems
does it seek to address? Jordan et al. (2010) highlight how actors
often engage in struggles to present, or frame, particular
phenomena into problems that suit their pre-existing political
interests or policy competences. One of the most difficult choices
confronting governors relates to which problems to address
among all those that concern the public (Dror 1971), how to
define, and ultimately how they should be governed. Decision
makers often find themselves drawn to particular problems and
problem framings because they appear to fit with the way in which
they are confronting other problems. This raises new issues. For
example, who is deemed responsible for the emergence of this
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particular problem? Have they deliberately caused it or was it an
unforeseen outcome of their otherwise legitimate activities?  
Massey et al. (2015) suggest that for adaptation to climate change,
governments have had a range of options for how to frame and
define the adaptation problem. Adaptation has variously been
framed as a problem of minimizing risks and sensitivity of people
and nature to expected climate impacts, or as a problem of
developing the capacity to cope with just extreme weather events,
or conversely a problem of developing ways to take advantage of
new climatic conditions. Even working within these frames, the
choice could be made to define adaptation as a matter of private
goods or as collective goods. It might also be framed in terms of
competitiveness between governments, where early adapters are
able to gain some form of economic advantage over late adapters
(see Massey et al. 2014). Last, it might be characterized as an issue
of equity and justice, either within countries where disadvantaged
groups may be particularly vulnerable, or between the groups of
countries, whereby wealthy countries invest in the protection and
economic development of less-wealthy countries. In our call for
contributions for this Special Feature we welcomed conceptual
articles about the way climate change adaptation issues are
framed, and empirical analyses of the way in which governors
and societal actors perceive and frame adaptation.
Level choice
Jordan et al. (2010) suggest that after having worked out how to
frame a problem, governors have to decide at which level to act.
They indicate the main choice is often presented as being between
acting locally, that is, decentralization guided by the principle of
subsidiarity, or at more aggregated levels, regionally, nationally,
or internationally. Massey et al. (2015) imply that although every
policy will in one form or another manifest itself  at the lowest
possible level, perhaps affecting individual citizens, the level at
which the policy is designed and implemented will have an impact
on its possible effectiveness and distributional impact. They
suggest that the development of adaptation policies be carried
out across multiple levels and that adaptation is already embedded
at the international level within the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the European Commission
(Massey et al. 2015). The choices left for nation-states, according
to Massey et al. (2015), are about deciding what roles national,
regional, and local governments can play; the degree of their
involvement; and the interactions between them. Consequently,
relevant questions are about whether there is a need for national
level policy framework, or whether government should act in a
more advisory, support role to the lower levels? Does primary
responsibility for design and implementation reside with
municipalities or the regions in which they are located? Here the
special issue contributions that address conceptual questions
about the politics of scale in adaptation governance, but also
contributions discussing adaptation as a problem of multilevel
governance were invited.
Timing choices
Assuming that governors know what problem they want to tackle
and at what level, they still need to decide when and in what
sequence to act. Jordan et al. (2010) state that identifying an
optimal intervention sequence is fraught with difficulty,
particularly in a multidimensional domain such as adaptation to
climate change that may affect many quite distinct sectors of
society and nature. Timing and sequencing dilemmas revolve
around issues such as risk taking (moving first without knowing
what others may do can be hazardous), profit making (where first
movers may reap a potential economic advantage if  their
approach is eventually “scaled up” to the national or even the
global level), and legitimacy (requesting some to act first or bear
more of the costs may be viewed as illegitimate). An important
choice therefore, is whether to act in a more precautionary
manner, or wait for others who do not share the same problem
framing and/or want more time to consider the scientific evidence
before acting (Jordan et al. 2010). Massey et al. (2015) suggest
that uncertainties over the magnitude, type, timing, and location
of climate impacts compound the difficulties of making choices
in this domain. They suggest that in some cases, though impacts
are expected from climate change, for example to levels and
intensity of precipitation, even the sign of change (whether an
increase or decrease will occur) remains unclear for some regions.
Should policy makers take a “wait and see” approach, waiting for
better scientific assessments; for impacts to become manifest; for
other countries to take a lead they can follow? Additionally,
should countries invest in long-term structural measures whose
usefulness may only become apparent in 20, 50, or 100 years, or
focus on short-term more immediate issues, at the risk of locking
into investments that may prove mal-adaptive? Can solutions be
developed that are flexible enough to respond to evidence as it
improves? Are there priority sectors that require immediate
attention? These are the key questions on timing that the special
issue invited scholars to address.
Choices concerning modes of governance and instruments
Which modes of governance will governors select to address
problems? Jordan et al. (2010) indicate that the main choice here
is between creating and imposing a set of enforceable social norms
hierarchically, i.e., through the instrument of regulation, allowing
them to emerge and disseminate via market-based instruments in
markets, or relying on flatter and more network-based modes in
which trust-based incentives play a more important role. Also,
they suggest the issue of meta-governance, how to connect the
various modes of governance, is relevant (Jordan et al. 2010).
Massey et al. (2015) also ask whether adaptation is to be engaged
in a regulatory hierarchical manner, or a bottom-up, networked
fashion. They also suggest that given the range in which the
problem of adaptation could be framed, anyone might be
appropriate. Further, given the fact that adaptation is often
framed as a multisector problem, the concept has arisen that
adaptation should be “mainstreamed” or integrated into the
policies and programs of other existing sectors (Massey et al.
2015). Under this heading we invited contributions to this Special
Feature that conceptualize the challenge that adaptation presents
and connect it to appropriate modes of governance. Empirical
analyses that focus on the effectiveness of certain modes of
governance, and the conditions under which they work, were also
welcomed.
Norms and principles choice
The governance of adaptation requires monitoring, planning,
regulation, decision making, and distributive systems, dispute
resolution, and juridical review. All of those are founded
nominally in the public interest, but this concept is not
unproblematic (for a review see, for instance, McHarg 1999).
Principles and norms offer legitimacy for government to take
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measures, provide compensation, use regulatory or economic
instruments, and protect rights. Societal consensus on the public
interest is based on approved laws, rules, and plans and is
nowadays often combined with a deontic (a rule and norm-based)
concept in which plans, decisions, etc. are judged by their ethical
content and a rights-based approach. This approach has both
substantive (human dignity, equal treatment, and property rights)
and procedural (fairness or due process, sound administration
and transparency, public participation, constraining free-riding,
and regulating compliance) aspects. At the same time, there is a
revival of elements of both a utilitarianism approach, such as
aggregating individual preferences and the use of a cost-benefit
analysis, as well as a dialogical approach in which the public
interest is a result of a deliberative process among concerned
stakeholders and affected parties (McHarg 1999).  
These principles affect the kinds of costs and benefits to take into
account when making decisions, how to allocate them across
different social groups, and whether (and if  so, how) to
compensate any losers. Jordan et al. (2010) discuss the politics
associated with distributive, regulatory, and redistributive
policies. The first type involves “... the distribution of services and
benefits to particular segments of the population” (Anderson
1984:113). Regulatory policies involve “... conflicts between two
groups or coalitions of groups, with one side seeking to impose
some sort of control on the other side” (Anderson 1984:114).
Finally, redistributive policies involve “... the deliberate efforts by
government to shift the allocation of wealth, income, property,
or rights among broad classes or groups of the population”
(Anderson 1984:115). Jordan et al. (2010) suggest that because
these three types of policy allocate costs and benefits differently.
They tend to be the outcome of different kinds of politics and
hence patterns of governing; in essence, distributive policies are
often welcomed by “target groups,” whereas redistributive and
regulatory policies are more likely to be opposed and lead to
conflict. Massey et al. (2015) suggest that deciding how much to
spend on adaptation is a daunting challenge. Cost estimates are
surrounded by a certain level of uncertainty, and given the
expected variability of impacts and their distributional
unevenness, the acceptability of spending on adaptation might be
different per region. Conceptual articles that discussed normative
frameworks that underpin the governance of adaptation, and
contributions that empirically probe the meaning and effects of
such principles were welcomed in the invitation for the Special
Feature.
Implementation and enforcement choices
Jordan et al. (2010) suggest that the final choice governors must
make is how to secure policy results via implementation and how
to enforce compliance. Should adaptation be implemented in the
classical environmental policy format of top-down steering with
one central authority, or can there be multiple centers of authority
to decide how best adaptation action could be taken at various
levels? Should governments follow a deterrence or compliance
approach to ensure that policy goals are met? What sanctions, if
any, should there be for noncompliance? Moving beyond these
standard distinctions, another choice presents itself  for
adaptation in particular. Should adaptation actions be
mainstreamed into existing policies across sectors or can it be
implemented through stand-alone policies? Some policy analysts
argue for a top-down approach to studying the implementation
and enforcement choices arising when governance is multileveled,
whereas others adopt a more bottom-up one (Hill and Hupe
2002). This distinction is useful, because it helps to establish
empirically who are the most significant governors and how they
affect, or in the future could affect, social change. However, the
approaches are based on rather different ontologies. From a top-
down perspective, the clarity of goals and the administrative
strength of policy instruments are considered to be important
requirements. By contrast, the bottom-up approach accepts that
goals are ambiguous and implementation “gaps” are the norm
rather than the exception. Once again we turned to scholarly
contributions in this Special Feature about implementation and
enforcement.
APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO THE
CONTRIBUTIONS
In the remainder of this article we detail how the contributions
of this Special Feature have addressed these governing choices
and dilemmas. Table 1 gives an overview of the various
contributions. There are 17 contributions, focusing on adaptation
governance in nine countries discussing adaptation in a range of
fields; notably water management, heat waves, rural development,
city government, the built environment, infrastructure, energy,
fisheries, and transport. The contributions rely upon different
research methods including interviews, focus groups, secondary
analysis, and case studies. The Special Feature also includes a
range of purely conceptual or normative articles.  
The framework outlined above is principally a typology of options
for the design of governance systems for adaptation. As such it
provides the tools for describing and mapping the choices that
decision makers take and thus reveals how a governance system
is designed. Such a typology allows for systematic comparison
across cases but further analysis is required to determine the
motivations behind the choices, and how such choices change over
time. Also, the framework does not help predict or explain which
effects certain choices might have and why.  
Focusing on the reason for choices, for instance, to downplay
equity considerations, means treating such choices as a dependent
variable. Massey et al. (2014) suggest that major challenges
remain. This is because of the current state of the debate on the
governance of adaptation, which does not have anything that even
closely resembles an agreed conceptual framework on these
matters. Given that situation, our ambitions here are largely
explorative and we have mined all contributions for indications
on why certain governance choices were made. Social science
theories illuminate typologies of explanations (following Abma
and In 't Veld 2001) distinguishes between (1) institutional
explanations, e.g., existing practices in certain jurisdictions create
a path dependency and thereby determine governance choices;
(2) agency or elitists types of explanations, e.g., the preferences
of elected leaders or policy entrepreneurs determine choices; and
(3) discursive explanations, the way governors talk and think
about climate change issues. They also mention (4) rationalistic
explanations, seeking explanations in the context and motivations
of governors, including “objective problem pressure”; and finally
(5) network-based explanations, e.g., advocacy coalitions. This is
not the place to dig deeper in either of these types, but we do want
to signal that we shall look for the types of explanations that our
authors offer for their findings.  
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Table 1. Governance domain and the choice of adaptation focus of contributions to the Special Feature.
 
Contribution
Jurisdictions Domain Empirical data Choices addressed
Baird et al. 2014
Niagara region, Canada Water, agriculture, wine
production
Interviews (38) with key informants in the region. Modes of governance and instruments
choices
Bates et al. 2013
Australia Forums for government and
business organizations
Interviews (24) and focus groups (2) in two study areas, the Swan
Canning region of Western Australia and the Hunter / Central
Coast region of New South Wales.
Level choices, timing choices
Benzie 2014
UK Coastal communities, heat waves
and droughts, climate change,
justice and vulnerability
Review of studies by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation’s Climate
Change and Social Justice program.
Choices related to norms and
principles
Dupuis and Knoepfel 2013
Switzerland and India Rural development policies Discourse analysis, how are problem frames translated into policy
documents, and policy outputs
Problem choices, choices regarding
implementation and enforcement
Ford et al. 2013
Not specified, national level
in general
Adaptation planning Not an emphasis but examples used Choices regarding implementation and
enforcement
Hegger and Dieperink 2014
The Netherlands Water Document analysis, 30 interviews with researchers, financiers and




India (New Delhi) Adaptation at the city scale Interviews (21) government, NGO, and academic representatives Choices related to norms and
principles
Hurlbert and Diaz 2013
Chile and Canada Water Case studies (South Saskatchewan River Basin of western Canada
and the Elqui River Basin in northern Chile), Semistructured
interviews
Modes of governance and instruments
choices
Mazmanian et al. 2013
Not specified, but more
concerned with the U.S. state
level
Built environment, infrastructure Conceptual/normative article Timing choices, Modes of governance
and instruments choices, choices
regarding implementation and
enforcement
Mees et al. 2014
Local authorities Adaptation in general Normative framework applied to three examples in the city of
Rotterdam
Modes of governance and instruments
choices
Munaretto et al. 2014
Not specific for one
jurisdiction, examples from
all over
Adaptation planning Literature review Modes of governance and instruments
choices
Plummer 2013
Not specified Adaptation as a whole Several examples, but empirics are not the focus here Modes of governance and instruments
choices
Schneider 2014
Germany Energy and transport Secondary analysis of survey data Modes of governance and instruments
Tomozeiu and Joss 2014
England Ecotowns/ housing Document analysis (mainly policy documents) Level choices
Vasileiadou and Botzen 2014
The Netherlands Extreme weather In-depth interviews with 40 persons Problem choices
Vink et al. 2013
Not specified Adaptation as a whole Literature review of some 1200 articles Timing choices







Reintroduction of the salmon in the Rhine river, changes in
altitude for best wine production, flood safety and nature
protection
Timing choices
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Focusing on the effects of governance choices means treating
governance choices as independent variables. There is a plethora
of directions in which such effects could be explored. Broadly
speaking, governance systems have certain outputs, e.g., the
policies they produce, and these in turn have certain outcomes,
environmental or societal effects, if  you will. Outputs are usually
connected to outcomes only after long chains of events, making
attribution particularly difficult. Also, the evaluation of both
outputs and outcomes can follow a range of logics. Often-used
criteria to judge climate governance (see Huitema et al. 2011) are
goal related (goal achievement, effectiveness), cost related (cost-
effectiveness, efficiency), law related (are legal principles
followed), process related (fairness, coordination), outcome
related (equity, legitimacy), and all can be applied with equal force
to climate change adaptation, and if  one does one obviously
prefers systems that are more efficient, effective, fair, etc. Here
too, we simply check the various contributions to this Special
Feature, analyzing what is being said in terms of relations between
governance choices and patterns in outputs and outcomes; here
too we take an explorative approach.  
We add a little twist, however, which is that in line with the guiding
notions of this journal we pay extra attention to learning and
innovation. We propose that systems that are better at learning
are more resilient, legitimate, and effective systems. We do not
suggest this without some hesitation. This is because we
acknowledge the fact that a key function of any governance
system (and the institutions embedded therein) is to provide
stability and predictability to societal interactions. A governance
system that learns and innovates is perhaps always better fitted
to its environment and more clearly pursuing its goals, but might
also continuously provide changing signals and thus lack such
predictability. For instance, we know from Duit and Galaz (2008)
that any governance system must strike a balance between
“exploration,” e.g., seeking new information or seeking new
solutions, and “exploitation,” e.g., allowing time for existing
measures to become effective or to rely on what works. The simple
truth is that institutional design choices pose dilemmas between
desirable features. However, we believe that in the current situation
the bigger risk is that of inaction, of nonlearning, and of not
innovating, therefore we place the onus there, and our task
becomes uncovering which governance systems perform better in
this respect. For us, learning refers to “relatively enduring
alterations of thought or behavioral intentions that result from
experience” (Sabatier 1998:104) and we hold that three forms of
learning are relevant: cognitive learning, normative learning, and
relational learning. The first type is to do with the acquisition of
new factual information (or better ordering of it), the second with
changes in norms, values, and belief  systems, and the third with
changes in levels of understanding and trust between actors in a
governance system (see Huitema et al. 2010). The term innovation
can refer to a range of things, but the case has been made that
three conceptions of innovations exist side by side (Jordan and
Huitema 2014): one emphasizing novel ideas (something is
innovative when nobody else has thought of it before), a second
emphasizing diffusion (calling something an innovation when it
spreads everywhere), and a third focusing on impacts (reserving
the term innovative for something that really improves the world).
We invoke the term innovation mainly in the second and third
meanings, and we insert it here because we cannot simply rely on
learning; something needs to actually change and improve and
thus innovate.
FINDINGS
Findings on problems choices
The articles on problem choices zoom in on problem framing,
and teach us three lessons. First is that climate change related
issues are being framed in various different ways. Dupuis and
Knoepfel (2013) suggest that governors can approach adaptation
governance from at least three angles: a climate change-centered
angle, a climate variability -oriented angle, and a vulnerability-
centered angle. In the first approach, linked to the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) fist
assessment report (1990), anthropogenic climate change is seen
as the problem to be solved. Climate change stimuli are considered
to be out of range of natural variability and described as
unprecedented. In response, additional, innovative, and often
highly technical measures are considered necessary. The climate
variability framing is associated with the second IPCC assessment
report, and Dupuis and Knoepfel suggest this framing drops the
clear distinction between “natural” and “anthropogenic”
variability, thereby downplaying the unprecedented nature of the
adaptation challenge. Exposure reduction policies are however
called for in light of insufficient capacities to address variability,
with uncertainty playing a key role in this discourse. The
vulnerability-centered angle is associated with the Fourth IPCC
assessment report, according to Dupuis and Knoepfel (2013).
They suggest that a range of social, environmental, and economic
factors limit the current capacity to adapt to external stressors.
This discourse proposes a holistic approach in the sense that it
focuses on sustainable development and pays extensive attention
to the welfare of vulnerable groups, a view echoed by Pelling
(2011). In sum, their analysis can largely be seen as an exploration
of changes in professional framings around climate change
adaptation. Vasileiadou and Botzen (2014), however, suggest that
when focusing on extreme weather one should distinguish
between framings by experts and those by lay persons. The key
difference between these groups is the level of awareness of climate
change, which is much higher in the expert community than
among lay people.  
The second lesson we learn from our contributions is that
framings matter. Dupuis and Knoepfel (2013) are particularly
interested in consequences for formal (state) policy processes, and
specifically the implementation stage in that process. Their
argument is that the adoption of a climate centered angle in the
problem choice stage leads to higher chances of implementation
problems. The other two framings are less demanding because
understanding variability in general, and understanding
vulnerability is less difficult in terms of scientific literacy. On the
basis of this very simple logic, Dupuis and Knoepfel suggest that
current eligibility rules for adaptation funding are exerting
pressure to implement climate change-centered types of policies
because they require project holders to clearly distinguish between
baseline development needs and climate change-related actions
(Dupuis and Knoepfel 2013). Because of this “interpolicy
coordination” conflicts between climate measures and
sustainability policies emerge. As such, policy implementation is
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constrained by the uncertainty that characterizes climate impact
predictions at the regional level. In the end, they plead for a much
stronger focus on the vulnerability centered angle.  
The third lesson deals with the possibility of crossing the divide
between different problems framings and learning. Vasileiadou
and Botzen (2014) suggest that bridging different problem
framings is very difficult because expert assessments of climate
risks are derived from models, whereas risk assessments by lay
people are more determined by direct experience. Secondary
information, i.e., hearing about the risks of extreme weather, is
far less effective in enhancing awareness. As a compromise
solution, they suggest that any communication about the risks of
extreme weather events should connect to the personal
circumstances and emotions of lay people. Hegger and Dieperink
(2014), on the basis of their study of a number of Dutch large-
scale research efforts in the field of climate change, suggest that
joint knowledge production might help create a broad and shared
understanding of the problems (collective normative learning),
especially when diverse groups of societal actors are involved in
knowledge production, and if  their reward structures are geared
toward coproduction.  
In sum, our Special Feature contributions suggest that governors
have the choice between a climate, a variability and a vulnerability
approach, and that at least the IPCC has shifted its problem
framing along these lines over the years, and that certain local
governors did the same. Our contributions do not indicate
specifically how problem framings shift and whether we should
see this as a “natural” progression resulting from increased
insight, or whether there is deliberate steering at work. In line with
a constructivist perspective, the contributions do clearly indicate
that science and policy coconstruct each other (Jasanoff 2004):
certain policies require certain scientific disciplines and findings,
which in turn suggest certain policy responses. The contributions
also indicate that on the policy side implementation of a climate-
centered approach (as opposed to a variability or vulnerability
one) is more complicated because of the scientific uncertainties
about anthropocentric climate change tend to spill over to the
problem identification phase of the policy process. The political
and power dimensions underpinning problem framing should be
a fascinating topic of further analysis. Tentatively we pose that
an emphasis on vulnerability (rather than climate change) implies
not only that the exact size of climatic changes needs to be known,
it also implies a shift in responsibilities, putting the onus on
“everyone” to become less vulnerable (and in line with what other
scholars suggest as more resilient perhaps?) See, for instance,
Tompkins and Adger (2004).
Findings on level choices
Several of the findings point to the disconnect between climate
change science and local and regional governments that are
typically tasked with climate change adaptation responsibilities.
Mazmanian et al. (2013) join the call for a more scaled down
version of climate change projections generated by the IPCC,
which would mean that local and regional actors have a more
solid basis for developing policy.  
In their analysis of the British eco-towns initiative, Tomozeiu and
Joss (2014) show how climate change adaptation goals (and even
climate policy goals in general) can get lost when such goals are
effectively added only later in the policy process; when they are
implemented by a bureaucracy with other priorities; and when
changes in national politics occur. They call attention to the
horizontal and vertical integration that is needed to attain policy
goals. And suggest that even if  it was a promising development,
the eco-town initiative was effectively more focused on affordable
housing rather than climate change goals, a consequence of its
bureaucratic positioning in the Department of Communities and
Local Government, and away from the environmental ministries.  
When attempts were made to strengthen the climate change goals
of the various local initiatives, it was effectively too late and few
initiatives focused substantially on climate change. Finally, when
the Labour government lost power, and was replaced by a
coalition of Conservatives and Liberals, national policies on this
matter were withdrawn, leaving the few eco-towns with an explicit
climate agenda to fend for themselves. Although these initiatives
may still become successful, Tomozeiu and Joss (2014) ask
whether “beyond the immediate challenge of keeping their local
initiatives going, these local actors have the capacity to contribute
to nationally significant adaptation policy innovation.” Here we
touch upon a dilemma encountered more often in the literature
on “polycentric governance” (see, e.g., Ostrom 2005): given the
fact that decentralization means that a certain form of “natural
experimentation” enters the governance system, having a
decentralized system opens up opportunities for learning and
innovation because many units are tinkering with (roughly)
similar problems. However, there is a risk, especially when central
coordination is missing, that effective strategies cannot be scaled
up to other jurisdictions (Ostrom 2005). Bates et al. (2013), in
their contribution on adaptation governance in two Australian
case study areas, pick up this issue as they suggest that “forums,”
task forces, advisory committees, conferences, public/private
planning processes, and their like, play an important role in the
travel of ideas across fragmented governance systems, especially
when interactions are repeated and certain actors play a role in
multiple forums. In doing so, they enhance social and
observational learning, and the actors that link various networks
have “capacities [that] represent collective assets that could be
utilized in coordinated and well-articulated climate adaptation
initiatives” Bates et al. also suggest that the skills of the central
players are crucial in learning, but also in managing conflict. They
claim that leaders must ensure that “[t]he preferences of
individuals who do not necessarily agree that climate adaptation
responses are essential but who will still be impacted by changes
that may occur are accounted for [...] by ensuring that they have
equal opportunity to express their opinions in forums and that
their concerns are given equal treatment and consideration in
discussions and decision making.”  
Summarizing, our Special Feature contributions (as expected
given the dominant discourse on adaptation) really did zoom in
on the local and regional levels, with some “forums” carrying
responsibility for the connection between various localities and
for sharing experiences. The choices that national governments
make, however, and the institutional setting in which such national
governments embed climate adaptation tasks, e.g., land use
planning or environmental policy, does have repercussions for
what can and will be done at the local level. The contributions to
this Special Feature do make clear that free standing local
initiatives might be successful in their own right, but that upscaling
successful approaches requires active interaction with other
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localities, either through specially created forums or through the
efforts of national governments. If  such connections or efforts do
not exist, ideas cannot circulate as effectively. Here an interesting
research agenda could be forwarded on the theme of governance
innovations in polycentric systems: How do such innovations
emerge, how do they travel across governance regimes, and which
effects do they have?
Findings on timing choices
The contributions on this theme suggest, on the one hand, the
loss of predictability in relation to our climate (Mazmanian et al.
2013 speak of the “the death of stationarity”). Second, they
highlight the strong focus of many organizations on the present;
Mazmanian et al. (2013) speak of “the dictatorship of the
present.” Bates et al. (2013) suggest that for business
organizations, circumspection is understandable given the level
of uncertainty and lack of guidelines for climate change in
Australia. They especially suggest that smaller businesses cannot
respond because they tend to focus on their core concerns.  
Hurlbert and Diaz (2013), on the basis of an analysis of
adaptation activities in Chilean and Canadian water
management, offer a suggestion as to why governments remain
(largely) inactive in the sphere of adaptation policy; they speak
of an “adaptation gap.” Specifically they point to the “embrace
of neo-liberalism as a strategy of development” as a causal factor,
meaning states enthusiastically support economic development
and pay only cosmetic attention to environmental issues. They
state the following:  
This strategy is resulting in an increase of risk to many
rural agricultural producers and is facilitating adaptation
to climate extremes in only a select group of producers.
This is very widely known in the Chilean case, where the
adoption of neo-liberalism has been especially
detrimental in terms of water resources. The adoption of
a neo-liberal water code, whereby water is considered a
privately owned commodity, has been an imposition of a
top-down system that has not only limited the capacity
of governance to establish adaptive water strategies at
the regional level, but also has imposed a process of
competition in a context characterized by an unequal
distribution of power [...] resulting in an adaptive
capacity to water scarcities that is concentrated in a small
number of large producers with the ability to have easier
access to water rights. 
In other words, the inactivity of the state mainly affects those who
cannot adapt individually.  
Werners et al. (2015) concur there is too much inactivity at present,
however they propose a way forward. They argue that local or
regional climate change assessments are needed and that these
should explicitly aim toward defining thresholds, that is explicit
statements, embedded in scenario studies, on what is and is not
acceptable in terms of climate related risks. The scenario studies
should lay the groundwork for future decisions that might become
necessary: clarity should be offered in advance on when which
decisions need to be taken, stakeholders need to be identified, and
policy plans developed. They suggest that adding such a forward
oriented component to the current policy cycles, i.e., long-term
budgets, land use planning, could go a long way in preparing for
an uncertain future.  
Vink et al. (2013) also point to the importance of the long term.
Through a meta-analysis of the science-policy interface literature
in relation to climate change, they find that this literature has (so
far) essentially ignored the long-term interplay between
“powering” and “puzzling.” They suggest that a number of policy
cycles will occur before any climate impacts become visible, thus
the effects of adaptation can be evaluated. Moreover during that
time, institutional learning and negotiations over societal values,
interests and goals are bound to occur. This means that in
assessing the potential for climate adaptation measures, one
should not adopt a static view of power constellations as is
currently common practice, but rather a fluid one. In combination
with the suggestions by Werners et al. (2015), this presents a
slightly more hopeful vision for the future.  
Summarizing the contributions on this theme confirm that many
organizations and governments take a wait and see approach to
climate change adaptation issues. At times, governments, because
of ideological reasons, do not see much of a task for themselves.
And more generally, it appears that smaller organizations,
including businesses, focus on their core tasks. Following Duit
and Galaz (2008), such organizations have a weak explorative
capacity and do not scan the future for possible surprises. When
such surprises do occur, many of these organizations are relatively
unprepared. On a more positive note, the “forums” that Bates et
al. (2013) analyzed do seem to offer a relatively low-cost option
for communicating and learning about climate change.
Additionally, there is insight that over the long run power
constellations might loosen up and currently unwelcome
messages or measures related to climate change might fall on more
fertile ground (Vink et al. 2013).
Findings on modes of governance and instruments
We received quite a few contributions on this topic, ranging from
fundamental considerations on collective action dilemmas to very
concrete findings on specific instruments. Mazmanian et al.
(2013) describe how adaptation is often seen as a responsibility
of private actors (so called autonomous adaptation), but, turning
the traditional view of adaptation as a private responsibility on
its head, suggest that a case for government involvement can be
made in quite a few instances, notably (1) when significant
spillovers or free-riding occurs from private adaptation actions,
meaning that certain actors either suffer from the adaptation
actions of others, or that they benefit without contributing; (2)
when significant economies of scale or coordination are involved,
making a collective approach more efficient; and (3) when
significant distributional implications or social justice concerns
occur. The consequence is that adaptation, very much like
mitigation, is at minimum a shared responsibility between the
private and public sectors.  
The contribution by Schneider (2014) is of relevance here. In
writing about “critical infrastructures” that have been privatized
in recent decades (such as power plants) she argues that private
sector decisions in the realm of climate adaptation can have
collective repercussions. She asks the following: “When former
state tasks, especially those involving critical infrastructures, are
transferred to private enterprises that postpone essential climate
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change adaptation measures, the question arises as to who bears
responsibility for deficits or the failure of critical infrastructure
service provision caused by climate change impacts.” She suggests
a regulatory framework that both accounts for the state’s position
of ultimate responsibility, which has remained according to most
authors in this field, but that at the same time enables flexible,
private-sector adaptation to climate change. Her analysis of the
way the German state regulates critical infrastructures suggests,
however, that this has not yet become a reality because the
German public authorities do not “account for the responsibility
for climate change adaptation by private-sector critical
infrastructure providers in a coordinated and comprehensive
manner” (Schneider 2014). It would therefore seem that the
responsibility for climate change adaptation falls somewhat
between the cracks in the system.  
At a slightly lower level of abstraction, several contributions deal
with what can be called approaches to governance, such as
participatory approach, or (adaptive) comanagement. Hurlbert
and Diaz (2013) for instance are very positive about the
development of local water advisory committees and their
integration into watershed management in both Canada and
Chile. They argue that “[t]hese collaborative arrangements are not
only important to secure political agreement around the climate
change agenda, but also to establish forms of governance that
could channel the participation of civil society in the
implementation of collective tasks oriented to secure the
resiliency of society” (Hurlbert and Diaz 2013). This Special
Feature also contains quite a few ideas on how to concretely shape
public participation in such forums. Baird et al. (2014) suggest
the production of a “social-ecological inventory” (plotting the
state of ecosystems, and societal systems, plus their interactions
and dynamics) and Munaretto et al. (2014) pose that participatory
multicriteria methods could be of use to concretely shape and
steer the debate in such forums.  
Few contributions to this Special Feature make an empirical
analysis of the effects of such participatory approaches. The
exception is Hegger and Dieperink (2014) who actually did not
find evidence that involving broad coalitions of actors in the
coproduction of knowledge enhanced the salience, credibility, or
legitimacy of that knowledge, but neither that such involvement
had a detrimental effect.  
Plummer (2013) addresses the usefulness of adaptive
comanagement in the context of the challenges that climate
change adaptation poses. Adaptive comanagement centers on “...
collaboration among heterogeneous actors with diverse interests,
institutions that are flexible and nested across scales and levels,
and analytic deliberation that develops understanding through
multiple knowledge systems; builds trust through repeated
interactions; and fosters learning and adaptive and continuous
feedback through continuous feedback” (Plummer 2013).
Connecting to the earlier distinction between public and private
provision and benefits in adaptation, they suggest that “[i]t is the
domain of private adaptation for public benefit in which adaptive
comanagement is best positioned to offer support as it brings
together public and private actors to address an environmental
or resource problem, typically a common resource, with diffuse
benefits not accruing to the individuals.” In addition he analyzes
the extent to which climate change adaptation issues fit with the
conditions for successful adaptive comanagement as outlined by
Armitage et al. (2009), which suggest that adaptive
comanagement is suitable for well-defined resource system, small-
scale resource use contexts, reasonably clear property rights, and
national and regional policy environments. On this level
Plummer’s (2013) conclusion is relatively bleak: “The context of
climate change seems to add a level of ‘abstraction’ and a lack of
immediacy, which may precipitate stakeholders to act in other
adaptive comanagement situations.”  
Finally, Mees et al. (2014) in their contribution, offer a practical
approach for local government actors that can help them assess
ex-ante the various tools at their disposal. This approach offers
insights into the general characteristics of various instrument
types, information on how these instruments handle specific
challenges associated with climate change, and how they fit to
certain goals one could want to achieve in certain adaptation
contexts. An application of the framework leads, for example, to
the conclusion that “performance standards” (regulations by local
government) work best in stimulating the construction of green
roofs.  
Summarizing our findings, we see again traces of neoliberal
thinking, in which the state should leave the resolution of societal
problems largely to the private sector. The interesting case of
critical infrastructure in Germany suggests however that even
when the responsibility for these infrastructures have been
privatized, there might still be a legacy effect of former state-
oriented thinking in the sense that the new private owners of this
infrastructure are hesitant to prepare for climate change, seeing
that mainly as a task for the government. In connection with this,
the contributions presented here have helped us better position
certain promising governance approaches such as adaptive
comanagement; the suggestion is that it fits well with situations
where private adaptations for public benefit are warranted. Public
participation is an essential component of adaptive
comanagement and it is striking how many authors endorse the
need to discuss climate change issues in an open and transparent
way. But the puzzle appears to be how to align this
recommendation with the abstract character of climate change
issues, and the lack of immediacy that Plummer (2013) speaks of.
Findings on choices related to norms and principles
There were only a few contributions on this topic, primarily
focusing on the criterion of justice. These contributions bring
important conceptual advances and paint a disturbing picture of
how climate change can compound existing inequities in both
developed and developing countries. On the conceptual level,
Hughes (2013) does a good job of providing a framework for the
assessment of procedures and outcomes of adaptation planning,
and for understanding the underlying reasons for the attainment
of certain levels of justice. She defines justice in urban climate
change adaptation as “just adaptation justly achieved.” This is
elaborated by giving three criteria, (1) inclusiveness, i.e.,
representation of vulnerable groups in adaptation planning
processes for a city; (2) prioritization, i.e., priority setting and
framing that recognize the adaptation needs of the vulnerable
groups in a city; and (3) impacts, i.e., impacts of adaptation that
enhance the freedoms and assets of vulnerable groups in a city.
The underlying mechanisms explaining justice outcomes are to
be sought in (1) the political economy of poverty, to do with
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political representation and access to decision making; (2) thick
injustice, or injustice in the distribution of burdens and benefits,
which is rooted in historical processes and is a legacy of past
policies that continue to affect the participation opportunities,
engagement, and outcomes of decisions surrounding land use
planning and public services; (3) technocratic governance, which
is the dominance of technical information in policy making that
can marginalize groups that are not using, familiar with, or
included by this information; and (4) institutional capacities of
local government, which means they lack the administrative,
financial, or technical capacity to successfully develop and
implement new policies and programs (Hughes 2013).  
Hughes’ study of adaptation planning efforts in Delhi
unfortunately paints a bleak picture. Vulnerable groups are not
adequately represented in adaptation planning as decisions are
taken in a centralized and nontransparent way; vulnerable groups
are mentioned in the adaptation plan but their interests are
defined in a narrow way and priority is given to the middle-class;
finally the assets of vulnerable groups have not increased during
the period in which the plan was implemented. The reasons for
this high level of injustice are located in two of the four potential
factors from the framework: the lack of institutional capacity in
the city administration, and the political-economy of poverty. On
the lack of institutional capacity Hughes (2013) writes the
following:  
Funding for climate change adaptation is extremely
limited. There are currently no dedicated funding streams
for climate change at the city level. Funding from the
national level will depend on the extent to which the state
action plan aligns with national priorities. Funding
through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
tends to favor very large projects that may not address
the needs of poor and marginalized communities. There
is also a lack of technical capacity in the city. All of the
assessment components of the state action plan have been
contracted to outside entities, including the vulnerability
assessment, emissions inventory, and climate projections
and scenario development (...). Finally, there is a lack of
institutional capacity. There is no dedicated office for
climate change in the city and currently very little invested
leadership in developing a robust and just state action
plan (Hughes 2013). 
On the political economy of poverty Hughes (2013) says: “The
poor and informal populations of the city have very limited venues
for accessing decision making, government programs, and public
services in Delhi,” which is largely to do with the fact that the very
vulnerable populations live in unauthorized areas, which formally
do not exist.  
Benzie’s contribution (2014) on flood management in the UK,
echoes several of the points made by Hughes. He finds indications
that “thick injustice” is occurring in the UK as well. In an effort
to highlight the social nature of climate change causes and
consequences, he suggests, “it is possible to identify a “quadruple
injustice” to climate change within the UK. Certain
disadvantaged groups, including those on low incomes, the
socially marginalized, and older people: emit the least; may be
negatively impacted by mitigation policies; are most vulnerable
to climate impacts; and, may be negatively impacted by
adaptation policies.” In addition, he finds that, at the
neighborhood level, there is overlap in vulnerabilities to climate
change because 64% of the extremely socially vulnerable
neighborhoods prone to flooding are also classified as extremely
vulnerable to heat. Benzie warns against oversimplification
though: vulnerable neighborhoods can be very diverse, which
means more research at the household level might be needed, and
in addition we do not understand the causality behind
vulnerability very well. Like Hughes, he does highlight the factor
“technocratic governance,“ however, as he speaks of an “over-
reliance on top-down assessment techniques [which] may tend to
hide the social nature of vulnerability and lead to adaptation
strategies that fail to protect the most vulnerable. This would be
the consequence of focusing on the size of a risk, or its aggregate
costs, rather than on the social nature of the risk: who will suffer
harm as a result of that risk” (Benzie 2014). In response, he pleads
for “more bottom-up analyses to inform adaptation policy,
incorporating procedural elements, such as more consultation
with vulnerable groups, as well as methodological elements that
base climate risk assessment more on current climate vulnerability
and that focus more on identifying cross-cutting issues from
different sectors.” Summarizing, we can conclude that the concern
for justice appears to be lacking in the realm of adaptation
governance, and in fact that some of the policies themselves
actually widen the gap between social classes.
Findings on choices regarding implementation and enforcement
Perhaps given that adaptation governance is a field in flux, and
it addresses a wide variety of objectives, progress is not so easily
monitored. Ford et al. (2013), in their contribution to this Special
Feature, capture the complexity well when they list the “three
main challenges [that] present obstacles for developing
approaches to track adaptation. (1) There is a need to define what
adaptation looks like in practice if  we are to develop indicators
and identify appropriate data sources for monitoring and
evaluation. (2) Characteristics of success need to be identified to
capture the effectiveness of adaptations in reducing vulnerability.
(3) Appropriate data sources need to be identified to facilitate the
development and tracking of indicators.” They delve into the
policy evaluation literature to see which approaches might be
suitable for overcoming these barriers. They find that “outcome
evaluation,” that is, assessing the actual effects of adaptation
measures, e.g., in terms of avoided damages, is on the one hand
the gold standard in policy evaluation, but on the other hand,
practically impossible to apply in the field of adaptation
governance. This is because outcome based approaches, “depend
on avoided impacts being visible and measurable. Outcome
approaches also imply that there is an existing record of impacts
over time, with implications for our ability to proactively avert
emerging impacts before they occur and, therefore, before they
are measured. Attribution is particularly problematic at a national
level, with outcomes through which adaptation success can be
measured being influenced by many factors besides climate policy
and not always being tangible ...” (Ford et al. 2013). They also
highlight the challenges posed by the issues of timing and
temporality: what might seem to be perfectly effective adaptation
measures in the short run may turn out to be very problematic in
the long run. Because of this, they look for other forms of
adaptation tracking, for instance methods that focus on
“adaptation readiness” (e.g., to which extent is political leadership
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Table 2. Domains of design and choice in adaptation governance and their focus, motivation, and potential effects.
 
Governance domain Principal choice or dilemma Motivations and justification Potential effects and outcomes of the domain
Problem choices Climate, variability- or vulnerability-
centered
Scientific advice, framing Implementation
Level choices Local level, forums for connecting Institutional factors, forums Travel of ideas, “upscaling”
Timing Short-term focus, wait and see Death of stationarity, uncertainty,
thresholds, neo-liberalism, carelessness
Procrastination, delay, long iteration cycles
between science and policy
Modes of governance and
instruments
Private responsibility, unless....,
collaboration and participation, but...
Framing and ideology, spillovers,
economies of scale, distributional
implications
Adaptive capacity, inequity, political agreement
and support
Norms and principles Equity considerations ignored The political economy of poverty, thick
injustice, technocratic governance,
limitations at the local governance level
Accumulation of vulnerabilities and injustices
Implementation and
enforcement
Monitoring and evaluation in their
infancy
Clarity on goals and purposes, clarity
of criteria, missing data, lack of
explicit action theories
Progress very hard to monitor
present, to which extent is there funding available, to which extent
are stakeholders involved), and output-oriented approaches that
focus on projects and policies (and assess for instance whether
they conform to international best practice). Finally, they suggest
that tracking measures of vulnerability might also be an option,
the creation of baseline information on vulnerability, or the
identification of regions with high levels of vulnerability might
help assess the effectiveness of measures in the future.  
Mazmanian et al. (2013) suggest, amongst other things, that
explicitly identifying the causal logic for policies might help better
assess the likelihood of eventual impacts that policies might have
(or not). The logic here is that failures in the “action theory”
underpinning policy measures will also lead to policy failure. This
point connects to the plea that Dupuis and Knoepfel (2013) make
for a better integration of the social sciences in the debate on
adaptation. They suggest this will help better distinguish between
types of adaptation (public or private, purposeful or incidental,
and to better conceptualize what is often labeled as “barriers to
adaptation.” They write “the concept of barriers to adaptation is
somewhat under-theorized and has been used phenomenologically
to list existing hindrances to public adaptation policy, leaving
aside the explanation of their origins or the causal mechanisms
by which they operate [...]. It is surprising to note the extent to
which knowledge, theories, and conceptual frameworks from
sociology and the policy sciences have barely been considered by
the research in explaining the political and institutional factors
that might hinder the adaptation policy process [...].” In sum, there
is a need for clearer definitions of what adaptation governance is
exactly about if  we are to monitor and evaluate its effects.
Furthermore we are stuck mostly with process and output
indicators in evaluating such governance, and it would certainly
help if  governing bodies were more explicit about the assumptions
that undergird their actions.
ADAPTATION GOVERNANCE CHOICES: SUMMARY
AND A RESEARCH AGENDA
Following a description of the main findings of each article in the
Special Feature, here we draw together the most striking findings
and make some suggestions for a research agenda. For our
overview, we connect to our descriptive framework, which details
the kind of choices governors, in the widest sense, make in the
emergence of governance regimes. Table 2 gives an overview of
the way these governance choices are made in the countries,
regions, and cases discussed in this Special Feature. We remind
the reader that this in no way is a representative sample of all
efforts at governing adaptation, even if  the number of
contributions is quite large. We have already indicated that with
the term “choice” (or the related term design), we do not refer
always to a purposive and organized decision process, but
sometimes to a process of emergence of patterns and behaviors.
In line with our definitions of governing and governance, many
actors will decide to engage or not with climate change impacts
and adaptation, and these actors will decide to engage with the
governance of new risks and opportunities in particular ways; the
pattern that emerges out of this reflects the cumulative effect of
all these behaviors, choices, and decisions. Some adaptation
governance will emerge from conventional government policy and
regulation, democratically legitimated. But much will emerge
within and between social groups and organizations more
organically. Table 2 also lists the “causes” and “effects” that have
been discussed in the previous sections. With both terms we refer
to causality; governance choices are made in a certain way; this
has certain reasons (causes, underpinning factors) and it has
certain consequences (inaction, effects on adaptive capacity, etc.).  
Having summarized the governance choices found in the
contributions, we now turn toward the most poignant
observations about each. In doing so we follow the notion that
governance regimes dealing with climate adaptation should be
learning oriented.  
As for problem choices, the governance of adaptation presents a
major dilemma. The key choice appears to be between applying
a relatively wide problem frame, which means that governors need
to deal with a very wide range of issues (health, water, community
development, etc.) but can also use the institutional capacity
available for these issues and have the opportunity for more
holistic solutions, and a narrow problem frame (only
anthropogenic climate change and perhaps focusing on a few key
areas). It appears that wider problem frames imply fewer
implementation problems later on, and less dependence on
uncertain scientific assessments, but at the same time, the
experience in land use planning for instance, indicate that some
agreement on core objectives, e.g., protecting human life, could
provide for a stronger identity. Outside this Special Feature the
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matter has attracted attention too. Bauer and Steurer (2015), for
instance, in comparing relatively broad climate action plans in
Europe with more targeted versions, suggest that applying a
narrower problem definition, e.g., emphasizing water issues, can
be quite effective, certainly if  this means linking up with a
powerful policy sector. The risk is that in such an approach,
adaptation measures do not take place in the context of a
comprehensive assessment of the risks and opportunities posed
by climate change, including trade-offs between sectors, an
assessment that is not only desirable but also strongly advocated
by the IPCC (Klein et al. 2014). A phased approach, where a
broad assessment is followed by a strategy with narrower priorities
that can be updated later would then be something to consider.
The actual effects, of having a longer term adaptation plan, and
having a narrow or broad adaptation strategy should be
systematically addressed in comparative research.  
In terms of choices about levels of governance, we can point out
that largely by default climate adaptation issues are most often
placed in the laps of local and regional authorities. However,
capabilities at this level are typically limited, certainly when many
small organizations are involved. Even if  this bottom-up
approach does create a quasi-experimental setting, where multiple
approaches can be tried out, there is a risk that small initiatives
fail to have broader impacts, and that insights gathered on the
basis of local quasi-experiments will not reach others who could
benefit from these novel approaches. In a truly polycentric
governance system as described by Elinor Ostrom (2005), there
is a strong central authority present to grow and diffuse novel
approaches, but also to produce guides and regulations about
proper decision procedures at the local level (transparency,
accountability). The contributions about norms and principles
suggest that such democratic guarantees are sorely lacking or
handed out in a very uneven way. We tentatively suggest then, that
more attention should be paid to the need for interaction between
local and central governments, and that some central governments
should take on a more active role when it comes to climate
adaptation. More research on situations wherein central
governments are actively involved, versus situations where they
stay on the backside, should be pursued.  
Regarding timing, we think that the empirically observable trend
is to take a wait and see approach, both in government and the
private sector. There were hopeful signs, however, about the
positive effects of forums where actors could meet and discuss
problems and exchange experiences, and about the positive
impact of having a long-term approach and vision, which can be
linked to every turn of the policy cycle as it occurs. In other words,
those propagating climate adaptation policies need to play the
long game and be ready for the opportunities that might open up
in the future. Explicit attention to adaptation thresholds, that is
the advance definition of acceptable and unacceptable climate
change effects, appears to be a promising avenue here, but more
research on how such thresholds could be defined and the actual
impact is warranted.  
On modes of governance and instruments, we can conclude that
the preferred approach to climate adaptation often consists of
private sector responses, but that at the same time there can be
quite a few reasons for governments to step in. Mazmanian et al.
(2013) identifies three criteria that can help identify situations
where the government should step in: when significant spillovers
or free-riding occurs from private adaptation actions; when
significant economies of scale or coordination are involved,
making a collective approach more efficient; when significant
distributional implications or social justice concerns occur. There
are ample indications that such situations occur quite often: the
contributions to this Special Feature are replete with
organizations that take a wait and see approach (which means
they stand to gain from the innovative activities from others too),
and distributional matters and issues of social justice are pretty
much absent from the debate (see below). But the devil will be in
the detail, for instance, large-scale solutions might be appropriate,
i.e. efficient, for issues affecting entire communities at once, but
they are also more likely to create certain lock-ins. Such lock-ins
could be related to the sunk investments, to the knowledge and
organization needed to build such infrastructure, which will want
to sustain itself  (see for example the case of large scale
infrastructure for flood defense in Venice by Munaretto and
Huitema 2012), and could also be related to the expectations of
the population; in case of large-scale infrastructure they might
start assuming that the infrastructure takes care of the issue and
they do not need to do anything themselves (see, for example,
Engel et al. 2014). In other words, efficiency thinking might lead
to greater government involvement, which might subsequently
lead to a greater recourse to technical solutions, but whether this
is more resilient in the long term is unclear. In such cases, other
options are likely to have been closed off  at an earlier stage. All
this points to the need to study the effects of individual or
collective choice processes on the long-term resilience of social-
ecological systems in more detail.  
On norms and principles, we can conclude, surprisingly, that the
issue of justice is largely absent from governance debates and
planning. The sources of this problem are multiple and not easy
to address but it is simply shameful to see that even when
governments step in, it is not to address distributional or justice
issues associated with climate change. In fact, it is even worse: the
articles here suggest that attempts at governing climate change
actually add insult to injury by not involving the most vulnerable,
by not solving their issues, and thereby potentially increasing
differences in society while increasing vulnerability. We join the
call of others (see, e.g., Paavola and Adger 2006, Barker et al.
2008, Pelling 2011) for greater insight in methods of concretely
remedying this situation. For example, best practices could be
studied about methods for effective involvement and
empowerment of the most vulnerable groups.  
On implementation and enforcement, we can conclude that there
is much more to be worked out. Our Special Feature contained
valuable contributions that indicate how instruments can be
chosen, how progress could be monitored, but much of that still
has the feel of a theoretical exercise. Some of the contributions
called for better conceptualizations of the “barriers” that might
surface in applying these ideas in actual practice and we feel such
a call is warranted. Something to address in this realm is the
likeliness of a tension between the need for a broad framing of
adaptation issues, which apparently helps implementation, and
the requirements related to the monitoring of progress. It is
currently unclear what adaptation success looks like (Ford et al.
2013) and clarification is likely to be more difficult when
adaptation governance aims for multiple goals at once (where
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trade-offs are likely needed). How to effectively strike a balance
between such contrasting demands should be studied more
intensively.  
The final observation points to the interactive effects between the
various choices, and to some degree to the dilemmatic character
of such choices: from an ideological perspective most governors
would prefer an emphasis on private modes of governance, but
that may mean that action is postponed or taken in a way that
impacts the collective interest. If  the government does step in,
private parties might become inactive. Participation of the
vulnerable is very much needed from an empowerment and justice
perspective but their capacities to participate are also the most
limited. Broad problem framings might be needed from a political
support perspective, but such broad framings make definitive
conclusions on progress very hard.
CONCLUSION
This article has introduced the Special Feature on “The
Governance of Adaptation,” with the aim of being of interest to
all those who are trying to understand this emerging policy field.
Our primary argument is that “governors” in the climate
adaptation domain need to define the problems they face, choose
at what jurisdictional level action will be undertaken, decide when
action will be taken, and through which modes of governance
and instruments. Furthermore they need to decide which
normative principles will be guiding them, and how
implementation and enforcement will be arranged. This Special
Feature provides a snapshot about the way these choices are
currently made globally, why they are made in certain ways, and
with which consequences. It suggests that problem definitions can
be narrow or broad, and that the way issues are defined has strong
consequences for support and effectiveness of governance, and
that clear thinking about sequencing may be needed, from broad
to narrow and back. In addition, we find that the current emphasis
in adaptation governance is very much on the local and regional
levels, but that strong arguments are available for a much stronger
involvement of higher jurisdictional levels, which are needed for
visioning and scaling up of effective approaches. We conclude
that climate adaptation governance is a long game, which does
not align with shorter political cycles, but which means at the
same time that many of such cycles will occur, each offering
windows of opportunity for “powering” and “puzzling” (Vink et
al. 2013). We have concluded that despite the emphasis on the
private sector in the adaptation literature, there can be good
reasons for governments to step in, including to manage spillover
effects of adaptive action. We believe the climate adaptation
community (practitioners and academics alike) needs to start
thinking in a more nuanced way about appropriate modes of
governance. The current thinking of “barriers to adaptation” has
been reviewed in this Special Feature; it is suggested that new
conceptualizations are needed. The word barrier might in itself
already be misleading because it suggests something fixed,
whereas many barriers are an outcome of societal and political
processes that are more fluid in the medium and long term. The
ignorance of justice in both the practice and study of adaptation
governance is one of the most salient points and in greatest need
of attention. We find that in some cases, rather than addressing
existing injustices, governance measures generate new injustices.
Finally, we have discovered that our knowledge on many aspects
of the climate adaptation governance problem is still wanting,
especially on the underpinning dynamics that explain why certain
governance choices are made. Hence we call for targeted research
on the dynamics underpinning the development of climate
governance regimes, and for research on the effects that some of
these choices have.
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